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It is widely observed that within industries or economic sectors some
ﬁrms systematically outperform their competitors. Wal-Mart in retail,
Dell in personal computers (PCs), IBM in computers and information
technology services, Microsoft in software, UPS and Federal Express in
shipping, Goldman Sachs in investment banking, Southwest among air-
lines, and similarly in practically every industry. Such super-normal per-
formance, generally manifested by sustained growth in sales, earnings, and
market value, is not attributed to monopoly power or competition-
constraining regulation, but rather to the organization of the leading en-
terprise. Such organization is manifested by unique systems and processes
employed in the investment, production, and sales activities of the enter-
prise, along with the incentives and compensation systems governing its
human resources. This collective resource, often dubbed “organization cap-
ital,” is the major factor of production that is unique to the ﬁrm and thus
capable of yielding abnormal—above cost of capital—returns, thereby gen-
erating enterprise growth. Most other factors of production, labor and
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University.petitors have equal access to them, and therefore yield, at best, the cost of
capital.1Organization capital, in contrast, is the persistent creator of value
and growth for business enterprises.
It is easy to conjure examples of speciﬁc business processes and designs
that make up organization capital, and even to conceptualize intuitively
this resource as an extra, unmeasured factor of production responsible for
abnormal ﬁrm performance.2 However, there exist no operational mea-
sures of organization capital. Such measures will be highly useful to a mul-
titude of decision makers. Managers obviously need to track the size and
growth of organization capital—the major source of competitive advan-
tage—and benchmark it against the past (is our organization capital dete-
riorating?) and against rivals. Furthermore, valuing organization capital
will enable managers to assess the return on investments in creating this
resource, such as information technology (IT) and brand enhancement.
Speciﬁcally, relating IT expenditures or brand enhancement outlays to
changes in organizational capital will indicate the returns on these invest-
ments and guide overall resource allocation (invest less or more in IT?). In-
vestors will similarly be eager to incorporate the value of organization cap-
ital in their corporate valuation models. In merger and acquisition cases,
the value of organization capital should play a prominent role, since, as will
be argued below, such capital is predominately tacit and diﬃcult to transfer
across ﬁrms, and hence of questionable value in acquisitions. Economic,
organization, and management researchers in search of quantifying the
elusive concept of “quality of management” will ﬁnd an operational mea-
sure of organization capital highly instructive, since this capital essentially
reﬂects the sum total of managerial decisions and activities.
In this study, we develop a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of organization capital
and estimate it for a large sample of publicly traded companies. We test the
validity of our measure within a widely used investment valuation model
and show that it contributes signiﬁcantly to the explanation of diﬀerences
in market values of ﬁrms, beyond the traditional value indicators of assets
in place and expected abnormal earnings (growth potential). We also doc-
ument that ﬁnancial analysts, the major information intermediaries in
capital markets, fail to fully comprehend the value of ﬁrms’ organization
capital, probably because of the absence of relevant information on this re-
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1. Even R&D yields, on average, the cost of capital. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis
(2001) report that the performance of ﬁrms conducting R&D is not superior, on average, to
that of ﬁrms without R&D. See also B. Hall (1993) for similar results.
2. Examples of speciﬁc business processes and designs that are components of organization
capital are Wal-Mart’s supply chain, where the reading of the barcodes of purchased prod-
ucts at the checkout register is directly transmitted to suppliers who are in turn largely respon-
sible for inventory management; Cisco’s Internet-based product installation and mainte-
nance system, estimated by Cisco’s chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer to have saved $1.5 billion over three
years (Economist, June 26, 1999, p. 12); and Dell’s pioneering built-to-order distribution sys-
tem, where customers design their products.source in corporate ﬁnancial reports (e.g., no data on IT expenditures, em-
ployee training, brand enhancement activities, etc.).
Section 3.2 of the paper discusses various concepts of organization cap-
ital and related research, while section 3.3 presents our methodology for
measuring ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital and the empirical estimates.
Section 3.4 examines the association between information technology—a
key driver of organization capital—and our estimates of this resource; sec-
tion 3.5 incorporates estimates of organization capital in a widely used val-
uation model to validate their usefulness, while section 3.6 concludes the
paper.
3.2 What Exactly Is Organization Capital?
A succinct deﬁnition of organization capital was provided by Evenson
and Westphal (1995, p. 2237): “organization capital . . . [is] the knowledge
used to combine human skills and physical capital into systems for produc-
ing and delivering want-satisfying products.”3 Speciﬁcally, organization
capital according to Evenson and Westphal relates to the following ﬁrm at-
tributes (the speciﬁc examples are ours): (a) ﬁrms’ operating capabilities,
such as product design systems, production management and engineering
(e.g., just-in-time inventory), input outsourcing (supply channels), and
marketing technologies (e.g., on-line distribution channels); (b) investment
capabilities, such as advanced project selection mechanisms (e.g., using
real-options methodologies for project evaluation), personnel training, and
ﬁnancial engineering in fund raising and risk management (e.g., hedging
assets, liabilities, and currency exposures with ﬁnancial derivatives); and 
(c) innovation capabilities,such as unique research and development (R&D)
procedures (e.g., a scientiﬁc approach to drug development), adaptive ca-
pacity for learning from others, communities of practice to share informa-
tion among employees, as well as decision and legal procedures for appro-
priating maximal beneﬁts from intellectual property (e.g., patent licensing
and technology turf protection). Organization capital is thus an agglomer-
ation of technologies—business practices, processes and designs, and in-
centive and compensation systems—that together enable some ﬁrms to
consistently and eﬃciently extract from a given level of physical and human
resources a higher value of product than other ﬁrms ﬁnd possible to attain.4
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3. In a similar vein, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002, p. 1) wrote: “At least as far back as Marshall,
economists have argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that aﬀects their
technology of production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital that
is distinct from the concepts of physical or human capital in the standard growth model.”
4. Sometimes the absence of organization capital is mentioned as a potential source of fu-
ture value: in an interview with Bill Miller (Barron’s, February 3, 2003, p. 26), this most suc-
cessful fund manager (an average annual return of 14.5 percent over the past 10 years) said
the following about Home Depot: “People are talking about its problems . . . but all these
problems are getting ﬁxed. This is a company that didn’t have any perpetual inventory, didn’tSome researchers on organization capital view this resource as embod-
ied in employees (e.g., Jovanovic 1979; Becker 1993). Elaborating on this
view, Prescott and Visscher (1980, pp. 447–48) include the following fac-
tors in organization capital: (a) “what the ﬁrm knows about the abilities of
its personnel . . . improving matches between employees and jobs by mea-
suring performance,” (b) what “the ﬁrm learns about its employees to im-
prove the match between employees working in teams,” and (c) “the human
capital of the ﬁrm’s employees.” Others view organization capital beyond
that embedded in people, deﬁning it as “a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good jointly
produced with output and embodied in the organization itself” (Atkeson
and Kehoe 2002, p. 3). Proponents of this approach include Arrow (1962),
Rosen (1972), Tomer (1987), and Ericson and Pakes (1995). In the pres-
ent study, we follow the latter—ﬁrm-embodied—concept of organization
capital.
The competitive advantages conferred on ﬁrms by organization capital
are mainly due to the fact that this resource cannot be completely codiﬁed
and hence transferred to other organizations or imitated by them. As Even-
son and Westphal (1995, p. 2213) note: “Much of the knowledge abouthow
to perform elementary processes and about how to combine them in eﬃ-
cient systems is tacit, not physically embodied and neither codiﬁed nor
readily transferable. Thus, though two producers in the same circumstances
may use identical material inputs in conjunction with equal information,
they may nonetheless employ what are really two distinct techniques ow-
ing to diﬀerences in understanding of the tacit elements.” The car industry
exempliﬁes the diﬃculties in imitating and adopting others’ organization
capital: with all that has been written about Japanese car manufacturers’
eﬃciency systems (e.g., just-in-time production process) and the vast ef-
forts to imitate these systems by competitors over the last two decades (in-
cluding joint Japanese–U.S. production facilities, such as the GM–Toyota
Nummi plant in Freemont, California), Japanese car manufacturers are
still the world leaders in eﬃciency, proﬁtability, and quality.5 Clearly, the
essential elements of organization capital are not transferable across ﬁrms,
even over extended time periods.
The partial tacitness of organization capital is among the major reasons
this resource is hard to measure, at both the input and output levels. Part
of the investment (input) in organization capital is not fully tracked by
ﬁrms. For example, the cost of on-the-job training, particularly the men-
toring of young employees by senior ones, is generally not recorded by the
accounting system. Also not recorded as an investment are the extensive
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have any point-of-sales terminals, didn’t have pay scales for their employees, and didn’t have
any centralized purchasing. It was remarkable what they didn’t have, which tells you how
powerful the economics of the business were.”
5. In January 2004, Toyota Co. announced that in 2003 it had overtaken the Ford Motor
Co. in worldwide car sales, and thus captured second place, behind General Motors, among
car leaders.eﬀorts of employees to better educate themselves and improve the eﬃ-
ciency of ﬁrms’ production, research, and selling processes (the “sugges-
tions box,” for example). In general, the smaller the enterprise, the less
likely that the accounting system will systematically track and record all the
investment in organization capital. Consequently, ﬁrms and investors lack
reliable input (cost) measures of organization capital. Nor is the output of
organization capital easy to quantify. Such output—business designs and
processes, for example—is essentially an intermediate product without a
market price (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, chap. 12, for discussion of
diﬃculties in measuring knowledge output). Moreover, the accounting sys-
tem does not segregate the contribution of organization capital to the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnal output (sales, proﬁts) from the contribution of other inputs, and there-
fore accounting is not equipped to value organizational capital.
Finally, to cap the measurement diﬃculties, the valuation of organiza-
tion capital requires an estimate of its rate of obsolescence. The emergence
of new systems and processes to replace those currently in use (e.g., Internet-
based supply channels), along with imitation of elements of organization
capital by competitors (J.C. Penney recently implemented a supply-chain
system similar to Wal-Mart’s) reduces the value of the ﬁrm’s organization
capital. Yet reliable estimates of the obsolescence rate of organization cap-
ital are not available. Thus, given the daunting challenges in measuring or-
ganization capital, it is not surprising that widely accepted measures of this
important corporate resource are not available.
3.3 Estimating Organization Capital
3.3.1 Methodology
We model the ﬁrm’s output, or sales (denoted by SALE), as a function
of its major inputs: physical capital (PPE: property, plant, and equipment),
labor (EMP: number of employees), and R&D capital (RND), where
RND represents the ﬁrm’s innovative activities, that is, its intangible assets.
The following function, which assumes constant returns to scale (as in
R. Hall 2000), is used to estimate organization capital:




where SALEit is the revenue of ﬁrm i in year t, a0it stands for organization
capital, PPEit is the net value of plant, property, and equipment, EMP it is
the number of employees, RNDit is the ﬁrm’s R&D capital (the latter three
variables are valued at year-end), and eit is an error term.6
It is possible to estimate organization capital from the residual of
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6. Note that the physical (PPE) and intangible (RND) inputs in (1) are measured in mone-
tary values, whereas labor (EMP) is measured by the number of employees. This is due to the
absence of a reliable, publicly reported monetary measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital.
This is, in fact, an advantage, since the presence of the number of employees in expression (1)expression (1), either by extracting the systematic component of eit, or by
inserting ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummy variables in equation (1). This approach was
followed in the early attempts to estimate total factor productivity (TFP)
in macroeconomic growth models (Solow 1957).7 The downside of esti-
mating TFP, or our ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital, from the residual of
a growth model is that a residual estimate is essentially a black box, re-
ﬂecting random shock and various omitted variables along with organiza-
tion capital, or TFP. This led Moses Abramovitz to his oft-mentioned
characterization of residual-based TFP estimate as “a measure of our ig-
norance.” Furthermore, it has been shown (Griliches and Mairesse 2000)
that a residual estimation of TFP leads to downward-biased coeﬃcient es-
timates. Accordingly, we have chosen to estimate the eﬀect of organization
capital on output by using the ﬁrm’s reported sales, general, and adminis-
trative (SGA) expenses as a proxy for organization capital.8 This major
income statement item includes most of the expenditures that generate
organization capital, such as IT outlays, employee training costs, brand en-
hancement activities, payment to systems and strategy consultants, and
the cost of setting up and maintaining Internet-based supply and distribu-
tion channels. For example, PepsiCo’s SGA expenses of $7.9, $8.1, and $8.5
billion in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively include advertising expenses,
sales incentives, expenditures to support global and domestic aﬃliates,
and expenditures on logistics of distribution systems (direct-store-delivery
systems). Obviously, such brand enhancement and organization design
outlays/investments are aimed at enhancing PepsiCo’s organization capital.
To be sure, not all of the ﬁrm’s SGA expenses enhance organization cap-
ital—PepsiCo’s SGA includes executives’ compensation, for example—
but it is reasonable to assume that most of the expenditures aimed at creat-
ing and enhancing organization capital are included in the ﬁrm’s SGA
expenses.
Speciﬁcally, we model the organization capital variable in (1), a0it, as fol-
lows:
(2) log(a0it)   b0t   b0st log(SGAit),
where SGA is the ﬁrm’s sales, general, and administrative expenses in year
t. We allow for two types of organization capital: (a) an economywide,
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shifts the value of organization capital embedded in employees (particular skills and incen-
tives) to the estimate of the ﬁrm’s organization capital, a0it, where it belongs.
7. In the basic growth model, the growth rate of GDP is related to capital, labor, and a resid-
ual, generally believed to reﬂect the economy’s technology or innovation capabilities.
8. A recent McKinsey Global Institute (2002) study of the performance of 1000 companies
during an eighteen-year period spanning 1982 to 1999 concludes that leaders tend to expand
their SGA costs signiﬁcantly above average during recessions as well as increasing their R&D
spending. That is, successful companies switch to an attack mode during bad times, because
competition is weakened, and do this partially by expenditures reﬂected in the item SGA ex-
penses. This is an example of building organization capital that helps companies perform bet-
ter than average consistently.common organization capital (b0t), which is available to all ﬁrms (e.g., a
certain level of population education, the prevailing legal and institutional
setting, etc.), and (b) a ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital (b0st log[SGAit]),
which is developed and maintained by each ﬁrm (e.g., coded knowledge,
production blueprints, business processes and procedures, marketing net-
works and channels, etc.).
A ﬁrm’s SGA is determined by (a) the level of the ﬁrm’s activity, as cap-
tured by its output (SALE), and (b) the committed portion of expenditures
(e.g., multiyear employee training programs), captured by the lagged value
of SGA. The level of output aﬀects SGA because as the level of activity in-
creases its business processes and practices need to be scaled up to accom-
modate the delivery of products and services for the larger base of cus-
tomers. The committed portion of SGA reﬂects the adjustment costs
involved in making changes in business processes and practices which are
not instantaneous. To accommodate the endogeneity of SGA we model it
as follows:
(3) log(SGAit)   g0t   g1t log(SALEit)   g2t log(SGAit 1)   log(uit).
We  estimate expressions (1) and (3) by taking logarithms of annual
changes, after substituting expression (2) into expression (1):
(4) log     b0t   b0st log     b1t log  
  b2t log     b3t log  
  log   .
(5) log     g0t   b1t log     b1t log  
  log   .
We estimate expressions (4) and (5) using the two-stage least squares pro-
cedure cross-sectionally for each sample year (1978–2002) for all ﬁrms
listed on the Compustat database that operate in twelve major industry
categories and that have the required ﬁnancial data (see appendix for the
industry classiﬁcation).9
Our sample consists of all ﬁrms with both annual sales and total assets
uit  
ui,t 1
SGAit 1  
SGAi,t 2














SALEit   
SALEi,t 1
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9. We use the Fama and French (1988, 1997) industry classiﬁcation, which is widely applied
in ﬁnance research, since in the next section we use capital market values to validate our or-
ganization capital estimates.greater than $5 million, to avoid insigniﬁcant enterprises. Data for each
sample ﬁrm on sales (Compustat data item no. 12); plant, property, and
equipment (PPE; no. 8); number of employees (no. 29); annual R&D ex-
pense (no. 46); and SGA expense (no. 132) are obtained from the Compu-
stat Annual Database. We estimate research and development capital
(RND) by capitalizing and amortizing the annual research and develop-
ment expenditures (R&D) over ﬁve years (a 20% annual amortization
rate),10 and we set the R&D expense to zero when data were not available
on Compustat. We generate our estimates for each sample year for two
groups of ﬁrms—those with R&D expenditures and those without R&D
expenditures—to investigate diﬀerences in organization capital between
ﬁrms that formally invest in R&D and those that do not. The sample con-
tains 57,258 non-R&D and 32,979 R&D ﬁrm-year observations, spanning
the period 1978–2002.
Panel A of table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables in
expressions (4) and (5), whereas panel B presents the means and respective
t-values of the 300 estimates (twenty-ﬁve years spanning 1978–2002 and
twelve industry groups each year) of expression (4) for the R&D and non-
R&D ﬁrms. It is evident from panel A that, at the mean, R&D ﬁrms are
larger than non-R&D ones, although at the median the reverse is true. This
indicates the presence in the sample of some very large R&D ﬁrms (e.g.,
General Electric, Microsoft, Pﬁzer).11 Panel B indicates that, for both
R&D and non-R&D ﬁrms, the logarithm of growth in the common, econ-
omywide organization capital (i.e., the intercept) is 0.03, which represents
approximately 3 percent of average output growth. This is consistent with
the aggregate Divisia index estimates in R. Hall (2000). For the R&D (non-
R&D) ﬁrms, the marginal productivity of plant, property, and equipment
(b∗
1 in expression [3]) is 0.08 (0.10), the marginal productivity of human
capital (b∗
2) is 0.33 (0.15), and the marginal productivity of research and
development (b∗
3) is 0.09 (where the asterisk indicates the mean coeﬃcient
estimate across all years and industries). The diﬀerence between the mar-
ginal productivities of PPE for the subsamples of R&D and non-R&D
ﬁrms is not signiﬁcant at the P   0.01 percent level, suggesting that R&D
does not appreciably aﬀect the marginal productivity of physical assets. 
In contrast, the diﬀerence between the marginal productivities of em-
ployees (EMP) across the R&D and non-R&D subsamples is statistically
signiﬁcant at the P   0.01 level, suggesting that R&D enhances the eﬃ-
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10. Most empirical estimates of the amortization rate of R&D yield an annual rate of 15–
20 percent (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis 1996).
11. In table 3.1, panel A, for ﬁrms with R&D: the maximum (minimum) SALE is that of
General Motors (Human Genome Sciences), PPE is that of Nippon, Telephone and Tele-
graph (Abiomed Inc.), EMP is that of General Motors (Franklin Telekom), SGA is that of
IBM (Vacu Dry), and RND is that of General Motors (Vacu Dry); and for ﬁrms without
R&D: the maximum (minimum) SALE is that of Wal-Mart (Lovelady Ike), PPE is that of
Deutche Telekom (Washington Homes), EMP is that of Wal-Mart (Lovelady Ike), SGA is




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)ciency of employees, apparently through process R&D. The marginal pro-
ductivity of SGA (b∗
0s), our proxy for organization capital, is 0.41 and 0.58
for R&D and non-R&D ﬁrms, respectively, where the diﬀerence in the
marginal productivities is signiﬁcant at the P   0.01 level. This suggests
that non-R&D ﬁrms sustain their competitive edge through organizational
processes and designs, generated by SGA expenditures, to compensate for
the absence of R&D.
3.3.2 Deriving Firm-Speciﬁc Estimates
We now derive ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates of the annual contribution of or-
ganization capital to output growth by transforming the coeﬃcient esti-
mates of expression (4) into monetary values. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne two
expectations of ﬁrm’s output (sales) from expression (4): the expected out-
put of ﬁrm i in year t with and without the common and ﬁrm-speciﬁc or-
ganization capital, estimated by the proxy SGA.12From expression (4), the
expected output of ﬁrm i in year t with organization capital is as follows:
(6) SALE∗
it   SALEi,t 1 exp b∗
0t   b∗
0st log     b∗
1t log  
  b∗
2t log     b∗
3t log     ,
where b∗
nt for n   0, 0S (S for speciﬁc organization capital) and 1, 2, 3 are
the coeﬃcient estimates obtained from the annual cross-sectional estima-
tion of expression (3) for each industry described above.
The expected output of ﬁrm i in year t without the eﬀect of organization
capital is as follows:
(7) SALEit ∗∗   SALEi,t 1 exp b∗
1t log     b∗
2t log  
  b∗
3t log     .
Given the two output expectations, expressions (6) and (7), our ﬁrm-
speciﬁc measure of organization capital (OC) is the diﬀerence between ex-
pected sales with and without organization capital:
(8) OCit   SALE∗
it   SALE∗∗
i,t 1,
where SALE∗
it and SALEit ∗∗ are deﬁned by equations (6) and (7), respec-
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12. We used the expected SGA using our estimates of expression (5) and obtained qualita-
tively similar results.
13. It is possible to estimate organization capital (OC) by subtracting expected sales with-
out OC, expression (5), from the ﬁrm’s actual sales (SALEit), rather than from expected sales
with OC (expression [4]). The drawback of such an estimate is that the consequent OC mea-value of the ﬁrm’s organization capital but is rather the annual contribu-
tion of organization capital to output growth.
Table 3.1, panel D (top row), provides descriptive statistics for the or-
ganization capital (OC) estimate. The mean OC is $96 million, represent-
ing about 4 percent of average sales (SALE in table 3.1, panel A). The esti-
mate of 4 percent average contribution of organization capital to output is
very close to Atkeson and Kehoe’s (2002, table 1) estimate of the share of
the economy’s organization capital in aggregate output, which ranges be-
tween 2.7 percent and 4.0 percent. Note also that somewhat less than 25
percent of the sample ﬁrms have negative OC values, indicating that or-
ganization capital can be counterproductive in certain years. Finally, since
the mean annual change in sales is $90 million for our sample (table 3.1,
panel D), the estimated average contribution of organization capital to
sales growth—$96 million—is almost 100 percent, indicating the impor-
tance of organization capital in generating output growth.14
3.3.3 Firm-Speciﬁc Examples
To provide intuition and insight into our organization capital measure,
table 3.2 presents the underlying data and ﬁnal estimates for IBM, cover-
ing the period 1994–2000. Panel A reports the values of the variables in ex-
pression (3): sales (SALE, the dependent variable), as well as the indepen-
dent variables—SGA; PPE; number of employees (EMP in thousands);
and R&D capital (RND).15Panel B reports the annual growth rates (log of
successive yearly values) of the variables in panel A. Panel C provides the
annual cross-sectional estimates of the coeﬃcients of expression (3), run
for the ﬁrms in the industry in which IBM operates.16 Note the relative sta-
bility of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc organization capital coeﬃcient, b0st. Panel D de-
rives the estimates of IBM’s annual contributions of organization capital
(details in notes to table 3.2): columns (B) and (D) provide for each year 
the log of predicted sales growth, with and without organization capital,
respectively; that is, using expressions (6) and (7) with the coeﬃcients re-
ported in panel C, multiplied by the respective logs of the growth variables
in panel B. Columns (C) and (E) of panel D provide the antilogs of columns
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sure includes the noise in the regression residual, whereas our estimate in expression (6) elim-
inates the residual.
14. In table 3.1, panel C, the maximum (minimum) organization capital estimate is that of
Total Fina in 2000 (Honda Motors Ltd. in 2002), and the change in sale is that of Total Fina
in 2000 (Mitsui and Co. in 1995).
15. The period covered (1994–2000) marks the remarkable recovery of IBM under then
chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) Lou Gerstner, who took the helm in late 1993 of the then-
struggling company. Data in panel A tell part of the recovery story: a continuous increase in
sales (from $62.7 billion to $87.5 billion) while cutting expenses (except for payroll and capi-
tal expenditures).
16. These computer industry estimates (SIC 7370) can be compared with the overall sample
(and time) estimates of expression (4) in panel B of table 3.1.Table 3.2 Illustration of organization capital computation for IBM
A: Fundamental data
Year SALE SGA PPE EMP RND
1994 62,716 23,840 17,521 256 14,504
1995 64,052 20,279 16,664 220 12,960
1996 71,940 20,448 16,579 225 13,625
1997 75,947 21,508 17,407 241 12,934
1998 78,508 21,511 18,347 269 12,829
1999 81,667 21,708 19,631 291 13,039
2000 87,548 21,854 17,590 307 13,351
B: log(growth)
Year log(SGAt/SGAt–1)l o g ( PPEt/PPEt–1)l o g ( EMPt/EMPt–1)l o g(RNDt/RNDt–1)
1995 –.1618 –.0501 –.1531 –.1126
1996 .0083 –.0051 .0247 .0500
1997 .0505 .0487 .0656 –.0520
1998 .0001 .0526 .1132 –.0081
1999 .0091 .0676 .0771 .0162
2000 .0067 –.1098 .0546 .0236
C: Estimates of expression (4)
Year b0t b0st b1t b2t b3t
1995 .07 .30 .10 .39 .08
1996 .01 .31 .10 .34 .08
1997 –.01 .24 .09 .36 .07
1998 –.02 .25 .10 .33 .08
1999 .01 .31 .12 .34 .09
2000 .02 .27 .09 .32 .11
D: Computations
log(predicted Predicted log(predicted  Predicted 
sales  growth sales sales  growth  sales  Organization 
SALEt–1 with OC) with OC without OC) without OC capital
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)   (C) – (E)
1995 62,716 –.0486 59,741 –.0628 58,899 842
1996 64,052 .0247 65,655 .0061 64,447 1,208
1997 71,940 .0259 73,831 .0129 72,872 959
1998 75,947 .0181 77,333 .0046 76,301 1,032
1999 78,508 .0479 82,361 .0122 79,476 2,885
2000 81,667 .0293 84,093 –.0055 81,221 2,872
Notes: The numbers in panel A are in millions of dollars, other than EMP, which is in thousands of em-
ployees. The numbers in panel B are the logarithm of growth of the respective variables (e.g., –.0501  
log(16,664/17,521). Expressions (4) and (5) are estimated annually for each of the 12 industry groups
deﬁned in appendix A using the two-stage-least-squares procedure. Panel D, column (B)   b0t   b0st
log(SGAit/SGAi,t–1)   b1t log(PPEit/PPEi,t–1)   b2t log(EMPit/EMPi,t–1)   b3t log(RNDit/RNDi,t–1), where
estimates of bjt are given in panel C. Panel D, column (C)   exp{column (B)}SALEt–1. Panel D, column
(D)   b1t log(PPEit/PPEi,t–1)   b2t log(EMPit/EMPi,t–1)   b3t log(RNDit/RNDi,t–1), where estimates of bjt
are given in panel C. Panel D, column (E)   exp{column (D)}SALEt–1. Panel D, column (F)   column
(D) – column (E). See table 3.1 notes for variable deﬁnitions.(B) and (D), namely the conversion to monetary values of IBM’s predicted
sales (with and without organization capital). Finally, the annual contri-
bution of organization capital to IBM’s output is reported in the rightmost
column of panel D, as the diﬀerence between columns (C) and (E). The or-
ganization capital data show a strong and sustained improvement in IBM’s
organization capital during 1995–2000, corroborating the highly success-
ful turnaround of IBM. Interestingly, of the overall sales growth of IBM
over that period, amounting to $19 billion (81.7–62.7), organization capi-
tal contributed $10 billion (the sum of the annual contributions of organi-
zation capital), or 50 percent.
Since the contribution of organization capital is reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s
performance (e.g., sales and earnings growth), the question arises whether
the measurement of organization capital adds useful information beyond
that in sales or other ﬁnancial data. This question is addressed compre-
hensively in the next section, but the following case of Xerox Corp., which
fell on hard times in the late 1990s, provides a ﬁrst inkling. Figure 3.1 pres-
ents certain ﬁnancial and organization capital data for Xerox. The line and
numbers in bold are based on our measure of organization capital (the
number is the organization capital divided by 100). The dotted line and as-
sociated numbers represent the stock price adjusted for stock splits. The
ﬁrm’s sales (not shown in ﬁgure 3.1) increased continuously through 2000,
as did net income (the latter interrupted by a few years of losses, mainly due
to corporate acquisition costs and other accounting writeoﬀs). As shown
in ﬁgure 3.1, Xerox stock followed suit with an almost sevenfold increase
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Fig. 3.1 Example of Xeroxin price over the 1988–2000 period. Alas, the stock price collapsed in 2001–
2, primarily as a reaction to reported losses and accounting scandals. It is
clear that investors were totally surprised by Xerox’s collapse.
Xerox’s organization capital, however, exhibits a diﬀerent pattern. The an-
nual contributions of organization capital to output (OCt) spanned $700–
1,200 million throughout 1988–97 (with the exception of 1991–94, when
OC contributions were close to $100 million). From 1998, however—two
years before the downturn in sales and the stock price—Xerox annual or-
ganization capital contributions decreased sharply to about $700 million
in the following three years. Thus, our organization capital measure pro-
vided a two-year advance warning of Xerox travails, relative to its ﬁnancial
reports and stock market investors and analysts. Thus, as demonstrated by
the Xerox case and conﬁrmed over the entire sample in section 3.5, the in-
formation conveyed by the organization capital measure is not subsumed
by the contemporaneous sales and earnings data of the companies; rather,
it provides a more timely indication about the ﬁrm’s economic conditions
and performance.
3.4 Organization Capital and Information Technology
Information technology (IT) is a major enabler of organization capital.
Eﬀective business processes and practices, such as Internet-based supply
and distribution channels, production design and control systems, or risk-
hedging mechanisms, rely heavily on the IT infrastructure. Indeed, Bryn-
jolfsson and Yang (1999) explain their unexpectedly large estimate of the
contribution of IT to ﬁrm value—about $10 of value for $1 of IT invest-
ment—by postulating that IT expenditures proxy in their regressions for
the unmeasured organization capital, which is the intrinsic contributor of
ﬁrm value. Accordingly, if our measure captures organization capital, it
should be correlated with IT expenditures.17
Public companies, however, do not identify their expenditures on IT in
ﬁnancial reports. Therefore, for a subsample of ﬁrms, we obtained annual
data on ﬁrm-speciﬁc IT expenditures from Information Week reports pub-
lished in its IT 500 survey.18 To quantify the association between OC and
IT expenditures, we estimate the following regression:
(9) log(OCit)   a0   a1[Year dummies]   a2MKSit   a3 log(ITi,t 1)   eit,
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17. Early in the ongoing debate about IT’s contribution to productivity and growth, Robert
Solow commented: “I see IT everywhere, except in the productivity data” (Gordon 2000).
Subsequent studies (e.g., Gordon and Baily 1993) recorded substantial IT contribution, but
only in a few industries, particularly computers and software. Others (e.g., Brynjolfsson and
Hitt 1996) reported a substantial, widespread contribution.
18. These surveys were published during 1991–97. Information Week ceased to publish the
IT expenditure data from 1998 onward.where OCit is ﬁrm i’s organization capital contribution in year t (1991–97),
ITit is ﬁrm i’s information technology expenditures in year t, and MKSit is
ﬁrm i’s market share in year t, measured as the percentage of ﬁrm i’s sales
relative to the total sales of all the ﬁrms in its industry group (see appendix).
We incorporate the market share indicator in expression (9) as a control
variable. Firms with eﬀective organization capital will capture signiﬁcant
market share. Thus, the presence of the ﬁrm’s market share in equation (9)
controls for certain missing variables that aﬀect organization capital,
thereby allowing us to focus on the unique contribution of IT to OC. We use
the information technology expenditures in the preceding year (ITi,t–1) to as-
sess whether spending on IT contributes to OC in a sustained fashion.
We also estimate expression (10), which is a variant of expression (9), by
using the preceding year’s IT expenditures as well as the current year’s
change in IT expenditures over the preceding year.19
(10) log(OCit)   a0   a1[Year dummies]   a2MKSit   a3 log(IT i,t 1) 
  a4[log(IT it)   log(IT i,t 1)]   eit,
where all variables are deﬁned as in expression (9).
Table 3.3, panel A, provides the descriptive statistics of IT, OC, and mar-
ket share (MKS) for the Information Week sample. The mean (median) IT
expenditure is $192 ($78) million, with a minimum of $1 million and a max-
imum of $4.3 billion. Thus, the sample includes a cross section of compa-
nies that span a broad range of IT expenditures. Similarly, the mean (me-
dian) MKS is 5.8 percent (2.8 percent), with a minimum of 0.006 percent
and a maximum of 75 percent, indicating that the sample includes a cross
section of companies vis-à-vis market share. Table 3.3, panel B, provides
the Spearman rank correlations among OC, IT, lagged IT, and MKS. Our
measure of organization capital is highly correlated with both the current
IT spending as well as the lagged IT spending (correlation coeﬃcients of
0.54 and 0.51 for current and lagged IT expenditures, respectively). This
provides initial evidence that IT spending is associated with building or-
ganization capital.
Table 3.3, panel C, provides estimates of expressions (9) and (10). The
coeﬃcient of MKS is, as expected, positive and highly signiﬁcant. The co-
eﬃcients of both the prior year’s IT expenditures and the current year’s
change in IT expenditures are positive and highly signiﬁcant, indicating
that information technology is a major contributor to organization capi-
tal, as captured by our measure. Table 3.3, panel D, provides the estimates
of expressions (9) and (10) when the sample is partitioned into companies
with yearly high, medium, and low market-to-book values. The market-
book ratio, namely the ratio of the ﬁrm’s value in the capital market to its
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19. We do not include the current value of information technology expenditure in expres-
sion (9) because ITit and ITi(t–1) are highly correlated (see table 3.3, panel B).Table 3.3 Organization capital and information technology
A: Descriptive statistics
Standard First  Third 
Mean deviation Min. quartile Median quartile Max.
Variable
OC ($ millions) 441 1,672 –9,656 31 181 553 17,782
IT ($ millions) 192 352 1 33 78 184 4,261
MKS (%) 5.86 8.92 .01 1.29 2.84 6.48 74.46
B: Correlations
OC ITt ITt–1 ITt – ITt–1
ITt .54
ITt–1 .51 .92
ITt – ITt–1 .04 .02 –.28
MKSt .42 .47 .48 –.04
C: Organization capital and IT expenditures
Expression (9) Expression (10)
Coeﬃcient t-statistic P Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
log(MKSt)[ 2] .42 10.59 .00 .37 9.11 .00
log(ITt–1)[ 3] .23 7.53 .00 .31 9.17 .00
log(ITt) – log(ITt–1[ 4] .28 4.46 .00
Adj. R2 31.17% 32.76%
D: Organization capital and IT expenditures—Partitioned by market-to-book of equity
Expression (9) Expression (10)
Market-to-book value Coeﬃcient t-statistic P Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
Low
log(MKSt)[ 2] .56 7.49 .00 .55 7.29 .00
log(ITt–1)[ 3] .16 2.97 .00 .18 3.14 .00
log(ITt) – log(ITt–1)[ 4] .11 1.03 .31
Adj. R2 33.24% 33.51%
Medium
log(MKSt)[ 2] .21 2.73 .00 .12 1.58 .11
log(ITt–1)[ 3] .34 6.52 .00 .46 7.57 .00
log(ITt) – log(ITt–1)[ 4] .49 3.68 .00
Adj. R2 28.04% 34.48%
High
log(MKSt)[ 2] .48 7.71 .00 .40 6.22 .00
log(ITt–1)[ 3] .21 4.33 .00 .31 5.48 .00
log(ITt) – log(ITt–1)[ 4] .33 3.27 .00
Adj. R2 35.90% 38.17%
(continued)value on the balance sheet—the latter reﬂecting primarily physical and ﬁ-
nancial assets—conveys investors’ assessment of the ﬁrm’s assets that are
missing from its balance sheet (primarily intangible assets). Accordingly,
high market-to-book value companies are intangible intensive—that is,
rich in organization capital. The estimates of expressions (9) and (10) in
panel D indeed show that IT expenditures are much more strongly associ-
ated with organization capital—higher values of the IT regression coeﬃ-
cients—for the group with high market-book ratios than for those with low
market-book ratios, providing additional validity for our measure of or-
ganization capital.
3.5 Organization Capital and Equity Valuation
Having developed an estimate of organization capital, we now examine
its validity by incorporating the measure in a widely used equity (stock)
valuation model. This model (Preinreich, 1938; Ohlson 1995) relates the
ﬁrm’s stock price to its assets in place (property, plant, inventory, etc., mi-
nus liabilities) plus its growth potential, which is measured by the ﬁrm’s fu-
ture abnormal earnings. These are the earnings in excess of the required
rate of return on assets (cost of capital). This model thus relates the value
of the ﬁrm to its existing assets plus the future abnormal earning, or growth
potential, expected from these assets:
(11) V it   BV it   REit, that is, V it   BV it   REit,
where V it is ﬁrm i’s market value at the end of year t, BV it is its book value
(balance sheet value of assets minus liabilities) at the end of year t, repre-
senting assets in place, and REit is ﬁrm i’s present value of abnormal earn-
ings at the end of year t (growth potential). The right-hand rearrangement
of expression (11) shows that the diﬀerence between market value and the
value of assets-in-place is equal to the present value of abnormal earnings.20
Section 3.2 mentions organization capital as an unmeasured resource,
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Notes: The numbers in Panel B are the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients. The low, medium, and
high market-to-book value of equity groups contain the bottom, middle, and top one-third of the ob-
servations sorted each year based on the market-to-book values of equity, respectively. The Information
Week sample contains 1,818 ﬁrm-years, spanning 1991–97. OCitis the abnormal output computed as the
predicted value of sales obtained by estimating expression (4) and the predicted value of sales with asset
productivities alone in estimates of expression (4), i.e., expression (8). MKSit is the percentage of mar-
ket share of ﬁrm i in year t computed for the 12 industry groups, MKSimt   SALEimt/Σj SALEjmt where
ﬁrm i belongs to the industry group m and the sum of sales is over all ﬁrms in the industry group m. ITit
is the information technology expenditure of ﬁrm i in year t as reported in the Information Week 500
survey.
Table 3.3 (continued)
20. The familiar Tobin’s q ratio, used to assess a ﬁrm’s investment opportunities, relates the
ﬁrm’s market value to replacement cost of assets. The latter is usually proxied by book valuesince it is not reﬂected in ﬁrms’ balance sheets and is therefore absent from
BV in equation (11). Hence, if our measure of organization capital cap-
tures important elements of the ﬁrm’s future abnormal earnings potential,
then it should be associated with the diﬀerence between the market and the
book value of equity (expression [11]). Accordingly, our ﬁrst validation test
of the measure of organization capital is to estimate the following regres-
sion:
(12)   q0   q1     b1     eit,
where MV it is ﬁrm i’s market value of equity three months after the end of
ﬁscal year t, BV it is ﬁrm i’s book value of equity at the end of year t, OCit is
the ﬁrm’s contribution of organization capital to sales (expression [8]), and
SALEit is the sales of ﬁrm i in ﬁscal year t.21 We scale (deﬂate) all the vari-
ables by SALE to control for size eﬀects.22Note that MV and BV in expres-
sion (12) are stock variables, whereas OC is a ﬂow variable (contribution 
of organization capital to annual sales). The estimate of b1 obtained from
expression (12) will therefore indicate the horizon over which investors
capitalize organization capital.
The market value of equity is computed as the stock price multiplied by
the number of common shares outstanding, obtained from the Center for
Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) database. Financial data on book value
(Compustat data item no. 11) were obtained from Compustat. Our esti-
mations omitted ﬁrms with negative book value of equity. The sample con-
tains 44,073 ﬁrm-year observations, spanning 1978–2002.
Table 3.4, panel A, provides descriptive statistics; panel B presents the
estimates of expression (12). The adjusted R2value for the regression is ap-
proximately 24 percent, which indicates that OC by itself explains a quar-
ter of the cross-sectional variation in the diﬀerence between market and
book values of equity. This suggests that OC is strongly related to the ﬁrm’s
capacity to generate future abnormal earnings, or growth. The coeﬃcient
on OC is 2.26, indicating that the contribution of organization capital in a
given year to the present value of future abnormal earnings lasts for about
three years, using a discount rate of 12 percent (i.e., [1/(1.12)]   [1/(1.12)2]
  [1/(1.12)3]   2.40). This is consistent with the observation in the Xerox
example (ﬁgure 3.1) that OC leads the stock price by about two years.
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of assets, given diﬃculties in estimating replacement costs. The right-hand arrangement of
expression (11) is Tobin’s q as a diﬀerence, rather than a ratio. The gap between market and
book value, representing investment opportunities in the qtheory, is manifested in expression
(11) by REit, the present value of abnormal earnings.
21. The market value of ﬁrm i, MV it, is measured three months after the end of the year to
allow stock prices to reﬂect the ﬁnancial results of year t, which have to be publicly disclosed
during the ninety days after the end of the year.
22. See Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) for the appropriateness of using sales as the scaling vari-
able.Table 3.4 Organization capital and equity values
A: Descriptive statistics
Standard First  Third 
Mean deviation Min. quartile Median quartile Max.
Variable
MV ($ millions) 1,521 8,146 2 65 201 739 512,833
BV ($ millions) 691 2,423 1 46 126 412 79,722
RE ($ millions) 124 759 –7,163 –8 2 49 32,399
OC ($ millions) 145 1,527 –4,441 1 15 74 91,773
r (%) 12 .04 8 9 12 15 31
B: Contribution of organization capital to equity valuation—Whole sample
Expression (12)
Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
OC (b1) 2.26 12.85 .00
Adj. R2 23.91%
C: Contribution of organization capital to equity valuation—
Partitioned by market-to-book value of equity
Expression (12)
Market-to-book value Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
Low
OC (b1) .35 8.95 .00
Adj. R2 11.34%
Medium
OC (b1) 1.65 8.01 .00
Adj. R2 49.38%
High
OC (b1) 4.67 10.05 .00
Adj. R2 54.55%
D: Comparing organization capital’s and analysts’ residual earning’s 
contribution to valuation—Whole sample
Expression (14) Expression (15)
Coeﬃcient t-statistic P Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
OC (b1) 2.02 29.42 .00
RE (b2) 1.17 15.42 .00 1.32 14.06 .00
Adj. R2 32.65% 24.73%medium, and low market-to-book value of equity subsamples. As noted in
section 3.4, companies with high market-to-book values are more intan-
gible intensive, and hence the contribution of OC to future abnormal earn-
ings should be greater. The estimates are consistent with this notion: for the
high market-to-book ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient on OC is 4.67, which suggests
that the contribution of organization capital to future abnormal earnings
lasts for about ﬁve years, using a discount rate of 12 percent, whereas, for
the medium market-to-book ﬁrms, the OC contribution to future abnor-
mal earnings lasts for about two years (and less than a year for low market-
to-book ﬁrms). We thus conclude that our measure of organization capital
captures a major component of the ﬁrm’s intangibles assets, or growth
potential, as reﬂected by the gap between the market and book (account-
ing) values of public companies.
Since organization capital is a major contributor to future earnings, 
and hence OC will be partially or fully subsumed by the present value of
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Table 3.4 (continued)
E: Comparing organization capital’s and analysts’ residual earning’s contribution to valuation—
Partitioned by market-to-book value of equity
Expression (14) Expression (15)
Market-to-book value Coeﬃcient t-statistic P Coeﬃcient t-statistic P
Low
OC (b1) .32 7.15 .00
RE (b2) .41 8.25 .00 .45 9.61 .00
Adj. R2 24.79% 15.09%
Medium
OC (b1) 1.52 17.18 .00
RE (b2) .64 7.58 .00 1.02 9.34 .00
Adj. R2 52.30% 22.50%
High
OC (b1) 3.15 21.39 .00
RE (b2) 2.62 24.71 .00 3.73 30.59 .00
Adj. R2 55.25% 32.56%
Notes: The t-statistic is the White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistic. The low, medium, and high
market-to-book value of equity groups contain the bottom, middle, and top one-third of the observa-
tions sorted each year based on the market-to-book values of equity, respectively. The sample contains
44,073 ﬁrm-year observations spanning 1978–2002. MV is the market value four months subsequent to
the ﬁscal year-end; BV is the stockholders’ equity; the discount rate (r) is computed as beta times risk
premium of 5.5 percent plus the twelve-month treasury bill rate. The beta value is obtained from CAPM
using the monthly returns for ﬁrm i from year (t – 5) to (t – 1). RE is the sum over ﬁve years of the dis-
counted abnormal earnings plus a terminal value. Speciﬁcally, REit   Σk 1,5 [FEikt – ritBVi,(k–1)t](1   rit)–k
  [FEi6t – ritBVi5t](rit– git)–1(1   rit)–5, where gitis the growth in [FEi6t – ritBVi5t]. FEiktis the consensus an-
alysts’ earnings forecast k years ahead for ﬁrm i, four months after the ﬁscal year t; Vit is the value of eq-
uity computed as the sum of REitand BVit; OCitis the abnormal output computed as the predicted value
of sales obtained by estimating expression (4) and the predicted value of sales with asset productivities
alone in expression (4) estimates (i.e., expression [8]).abnormal earnings (RE), we omitted REit from the regression in expres-
sion (12). We now introduce a widely used proxy for future earnings—ﬁ-
nancial analysts’ forecasts of earnings—into the valuation model.23 In es-
sence, we wish to test the extent to which ﬁnancial analysts, the major
information intermediaries in capital markets, comprehend the value and
proﬁt implications of organization capital in their analyses and consequent
earnings forecasts.
Accordingly, we compute the present value of the ﬁrm’s abnormal earn-
ings as the sum of two components: the present value of abnormal earnings
in the next ﬁve years, based on explicit analysts’ forecasts of annual earn-
ings, plus the present value of abnormal earnings from year six to inﬁnity.
The overall present value of abnormal earnings is deﬁned thus:
(13) REit   k 1,5[FEikt   ritBV i(k 1)t](1   rit) k
  (FEi6t   ritBV i5t)(rit   git) 1(1   rit) 5,
where FEikt is the consensus analysts’ earnings forecast for ﬁrm i, k years
ahead, made four months after the end of ﬁscal year t(to allow ﬁnancial an-
alysts access to the annual report of year t); rit is the discount rate applied 
to future earnings; BVit is the book value (net assets) of ﬁrm i at the end of
year t(BV ikt BV i,[k–1]t FEikt– DIV ikt); DIV itis the dividend the ﬁrm paid in
year t; and git is the growth rate of abnormal earnings in year six (FEi6t – 
ritBV i5t).24 Thus, residual earnings for each future year—the diﬀerence be-
tween analysts’ earnings forecast for that year (FE) and a charge for the cost
of equity (rBV)—are predicted for each company for the next ﬁve years, fol-
lowed by a terminal value, based on a constant growth expression. We esti-
mate ﬁrm-speciﬁc discount rate, rit, using the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) with a beta (systematic risk) indicator estimated in a conventional
fashion (regressing the ﬁrm’s monthly stock returns on the market return),
using returns from the preceding sixty months. The discount rate is then set
equal to the twelve-month Treasury bill rate (the riskless rate) plus the esti-
mated beta multiplied by an equity risk premium of 5.5 percent.25
To examine the extent to which ﬁnancial analysts incorporate elements
of the organization capital estimate, OC, into their future earnings fore-
casts, we estimate the following two expressions:
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23. Commercially available forecasts of future earnings are provided by various sources for
most public companies for one, two, and sometimes three years out, as well as long-term (ﬁve
years out) growth rates of earnings. We obtained analysts’ consensus (mean) earnings fore-
casts (for multiple forecasts per ﬁrm) and long-term growth estimates from I/B/E/S (First
Call).
24. The growth rate from year ﬁve on, git, is set equal to ritminus 3 percent, if git (rit– 0.03).
We used the current dividend payout ratio (dividends to earnings) to estimate expected divi-
dends and winsorized the dividend payout ratio at 10 percent if the current dividend payout
ratio exceeded 10 percent.
25. We obtain similar results when using a constant discount rate of either 10 percent or 12
percent for all ﬁrms.(14)   q0   q1     b1  
  b2     eit,
and
(15)   q0   q1     b2     eit,
where all variables retain their previous deﬁnitions. Expression (15) pro-
vides the estimation of the valuation model without organization capital,
OC, whereas expression (14) includes the organization capital. If analysts
fully incorporate the contribution of organization capital to future earn-
ings in their earnings forecasts, then OC will be subsumed in RE, and the
coeﬃcient on OC in expression (14) will be zero. Conversely, if analysts do
not fully incorporate the eﬀect of organization capital in their earnings
forecasts, the coeﬃcient on OC (b1) will be positive, and the explanatory
power of expression (14) will be higher than that of expression (15). In this
manner, we assess analysts’ ability to value ﬁrms’ organization capital.
Table 3.4, panel D, provides estimates of expressions (14) and (15), in-
dicating that the addition of organization capital (OC) to the valuation
expression (14) substantially improves the explanatory power: from 24 per-
cent (adjusted R2 of expression [15]) to 32 percent (adjusted R2 of expres-
sion [14]). The coeﬃcient estimate on the ﬂow variable OC is 2.02 and is
highly statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that ﬁnancial analysts fail to cap-
ture a major asset (organization capital) that contributes to future prof-
itability.
Table 3.4, panel E, provides estimates of expressions (14) and (15) when
the sample is partitioned into three groups of ﬁrms ranked by market-to-
book value of equity. For all partitions, the OC measure improves the ex-
planatory power of the gap between market and book values. However, OC
provides the largest improvement in explanatory power for the medium 
and high market-to-book groups: the adjusted R2 of expression (14) is 52
percent (medium) and 55 percent (high) versus 22 percent and 32 percent
for expression (15), respectively. This suggests that ﬁnancial analysts, the
highly inﬂuential information intermediaries in capital markets, fail to fully
comprehend the value and impact of organization capital, and that this fail-
ure is particularly acute for high-growth (high market-to-book) ﬁrms.
The adjusted-R2measures of the yearly estimates of expressions (14) and
(15) are presented in ﬁgure 3.2: the top line is the adjusted-R2 value of the
model that includes organization capital (expression [14]), and the bottom
line is for the model without organization capital (expression [15]). The ﬁg-
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The Valuation of Organization Capital 95zation capital over the information in the present value of residual earnings
(the horizontal diﬀerence between the lines) was positive throughout the
period, but has decreased during the late 1990s. The probable reason: ﬁ-
nancial analysts, whose forecasts determine RE in expression (15), are be-
coming increasingly sophisticated in incorporating the beneﬁts of organi-
zation capital in their earnings forecasts.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Organization capital is the major idiosyncratic resource that aﬀects per-
formance and growth of ﬁrms. However, this resource is not measured in-
ternally by companies, nor is it reported to capital markets. In this study, we
develop a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of organization capital and estimate it for a
large sample of publicly traded companies. To validate our measure, we ex-
amine the association between information technology expenditures and
organization capital and ﬁnd that IT is highly associated with organization
capital. We then test the validity of our measure within a widely used in-
vestment valuation model and show that it contributes signiﬁcantly to the
explanation of market values of ﬁrms, beyond the traditional indicators of
assets in place (book value) and expected abnormal earnings (growth po-
tential). We also document that ﬁnancial analysts, the major information
intermediaries in capital markets, fail to fully comprehend the value of
ﬁrms’ organization capital, probably because of the absence of relevant in-
formation on this resource in corporate ﬁnancial reports (e.g., no data on
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Fig. 3.2 Explanatory power of expressions (14) and (15)IT expenditures, employee training, brand enhancement activities, etc.).
Our measure of organization capital is, therefore, expected to improve both
resource allocation within companies and investors’ valuations.
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Comment Timothy F. Bresnahan
The goal of this paper is an important one. The authors set out to deﬁne
“organizational capital,” to measure it, and to see whether capital markets
properly value it in large companies. The importance arises from several
conjectures that I and many others share with the authors. Few doubt that
the organization of ﬁrms is among the determinants of productivity and
productivity growth. Few doubt the value of a set of systematic measures
in this area. Few doubt that reorganization of ﬁrms arising from use of in-
formation technology will leave customers better oﬀ and successful ﬁrms
with higher market shares. And ﬁnally, few doubt that the widespread as-
sertion of a “new economy” form of organizational capital gave capital
markets an extraordinarily diﬃcult valuation problem in the late 1990s. All
these conjectures lead us toward goals like those in this paper.
The paper’s methods to measure organizational capital center on pro-
duction function residuals at the ﬁrm level. The authors focus on large,
publicly traded ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst approach, a Cobb-Douglas production
function, with R&D as one of the inputs, is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences
with ﬁrm dummies. The residual is cumulated and called organizational
capital.
In this approach a high rate of growth of ﬁrm sales, above and beyond
growth in employment, physical capital, and R&D capital, measures the
rate of growth of organization capital. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are mod-
eled as moving over time. At year t, the measure of organizational capital
growth comes from the model run on years t – 4 through t. The next year,
the measure of organizational capital growth comes from the model run on
years t – 3 to t   1, and so on.
In a second approach, the ﬁrm’s sales, general, and administrative costs
(SGA) are taken to be a measure of expenditures to gain organizational
capital (OC). A production function more general than the Cobb-Douglas
is estimated; all the Cobb-Douglas parameters are allowed to vary with
SGA. The measure of OC comes from comparing predicted sales at SGA
  0 to the actuals. Thus, in the second version, a productivity residual is
projected onto SGA and the interaction of SGA with other inputs and
called OC.
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Timothy F. Bresnahan is the Landau Professor of Technology in the Economy at Stanford
University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.With those two sets of estimates in hand, the paper examines several
economic questions. The authors seek to document the size and growth 
of measured OC in the class of ﬁrms they study. They investigate whether
measured OC is correlated with any of several variables associated with
theories of organizational improvement. These include market share, com-
puter investment, and administrative expenses. Finally, the authors exam-
ine the stock market valuation of measured OC using standard ﬁnance
methods. They are interested in both the degree to which the stock market
values companies that have high measured OC and the question of whether
the stock market over- or undervalues such companies.
The particular methods choices determine the empirical content of the
measures of OC. Much trouble arises because it is diﬃcult to become con-
vinced that production function residuals at the ﬁrm level measure OC.
I will begin with a discussion of what we have learned from earlier re-
search that uses methods related to this paper. I will then turn to the main
results and their interpretation. Potential worries about whether the object
that has been measured might be precisely something called “organiza-
tional capital” grow as we examine the authors’ tests of organizational the-
ories, their growth accounting, and their capital market investigations. I
will go on to talk about the conceptual and data limitations that are hold-
ing back this entire ﬁeld, not just this paper.
Methods I: Residuals
The most important modeling choice in the paper is to measure OC ei-
ther as a production function residual at the ﬁrm level or as the portion of
a production function residual that is explained by variation in SGA.
In general, estimating production functions is not a happy task. It is very
diﬃcult to succeed in that eﬀort either at the aggregate level or at the indi-
vidual ﬁrm level. At the aggregate level, it is diﬃcult to get the output de-
ﬂators right, so that real output—the dependent variable in the production
function—is always suspect. At the ﬁrm level, that particular problem is
somewhat ameliorated. Firms that have some hard-to-measure competi-
tive advantage, such as better products, will tend to have larger market
shares in industry equilibrium. They will thus tend to have larger nominal
sales. To the degree it comes from a superior production technology that is
uncorrelated with other factors of production, production function esti-
mates will capture it.
That is the basic logic under which this paper might be right. Organiza-
tion capital is likely to be reﬂected in superior products, especially in the
service sectors. Thus, looking at a ﬁrm-level productivity residual may well
capture OC if it is there.
The downside of working at the ﬁrm level is that ﬁrms are highly hetero-
geneous. Unobserved heterogeneity in ﬁrm-level productivity or demand
makes estimating the production function diﬃcult. Even with panel data on
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if one is hoping to tell apart selection, endogeneity in the inputs, and true
advantages to the ﬁrm in better productivity.1 The ﬁrm-level productivity
residual can measure, inter alia, unobserved demand and supply move-
ments at the ﬁrm and industry level and the ﬁrm’s response to those shocks.
This is the downside of the logic behind the measurement strategy of this
paper. The ﬁrm-level production function residual may well contain the
eﬀects of OC if it is there, but it will also contain everything else about how
ﬁrms are diﬀerent, or in diﬀerent circumstances. The fundamental idea of
the paper is a relativeone. Those ﬁrms with more output growth per unit in-
put growth relative to other ﬁrms are labeled as high-measured-OC ﬁrms.
On balance, I suspect ﬁrm-level analysis is likely the least bad for the
purposes of this paper, which is about ﬁrms, but it is important to recall
what it can and cannot do. The paper’s calculations, which make no eﬀort
to control for the most familiar measurement problems in this area, are
likely suspect.
Methods II: Organizations
The second fundamental point to make about methods relates to the
measurement of organizations. The paper does not measure ﬁrm organi-
zation.
There are no measures of hierarchy or its absence; no measures of cen-
tralization or decentralization; no measures of the degree to which work-
ers are on dynamic incentive contracts; no measures of the divisional struc-
ture of the ﬁrm; no measures of the workplace organization in productive
units; no measures of corporate culture; and no measures of the role of
management. In short, there are no measures suggested by the theory or
empirical literatures in empirical or theoretical organizational behavior or
the economics of organizations.2
The paper does use the ﬁrm’s expenditures on SGA as a predictor of the
production function residual. The implicit story is that a ﬁrm that spends
more money on administration (the “A” in SGA) is organizing itself better.
For a number of reasons, the dollars spent by a ﬁrm on SGA have only
a very distant linkage to “organizational capital” in the sense of the paper.
The most direct point is that a badly organized ﬁrm may need more man-
agers, not fewer. A separate point is that SGA includes marketing expen-
ditures as well as managerial ones.
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1. While these arguments are longstanding, perhaps the clearest sense of the trade-oﬀs can
be found in Griliches and Mairesse (1998). That paper reports an interesting eﬀort to deal
with the problem, as does one by Olley and Pakes (1996), with a nonparametric selection
model.
2. A summary of the relevant theory can be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1992). Recent
empirical and theoretical developments were reported at the NBER Organizational Eco-
nomics Conference: see http://www.nber.org/~confer/2002/orgec02/program.html.There are also serious econometric issues associated with SGA. Of
course it is possible that the SGA coeﬃcients measure managers’ organi-
zational contribution. To the extent that organizing the ﬁrm is costly and
these costs are reﬂected in SGA, that would be the right interpretation.
There is a problem with the implicit identifying assumption in that (most
positive) case. If ﬁrms with higher SGA are more productive, are ﬁrms with
lower SGA making mistakes?
More serious problems arise when either SGA is not the only driver of
improved organization or it is not given by some exogenous process. Sup-
pose that there are organizational improvements that do not lead to more
expenditure on SGA, such as improvements in workplace organization,
streamlining bureaucracy, improvements in the quality of decisions of
their communications, and so on. The paper will not measure these.
The paper will, incorrectly, measure correlations between SGA and the
ﬁrm residual that are not causal. If ﬁrms with looser budgets spend more
on management salaries, for example, that will be measured as OC in this
paper. Thus, an uptick in sales, part of which becomes management rents,
is called OC.
My real point is that there is only so much that can be done with pro-
duction function residuals. This paper labels a production function resid-
ual as OC. Sometimes, it uses only the part of the residual that can be pre-
dicted by SGA, or SGA interacted with the factors of production. It is
always using a productivity residual, however.
An alternative approach would be to link outcomes at the ﬁrm level em-
pirically to data that actually measure something about organizations.
There are many approaches to that (see note 3). In recent work related to
this paper, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin Hitt and I (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt, 2002) have tested the hypothesis that investments in information
technology are complementary to workplace organization. In our work,
the organizational variables we use are measures of the way production
workers are connected to the ﬁrm—how they are supervised, whether they
work in teams, the nature of their in-house training, and so on. In my view,
much of the reason to believe the conclusion that the results are speciﬁcally
organizational depends on the use of these data. We are hardly alone in
this. For example, Cockburn and Henderson (1998) have interesting mea-
sures of the organization of laboratories in pharmaceutical ﬁrms, related
to the ﬁrms’ ability to absorb scientiﬁc knowledge and turn it into prof-
itable products.
One could go on in this vein for some time. Recent research has made
some progress in measuring organizational features at the ﬁrm and indus-
try level and relating them to economic outcomes, but there is still much
work to be done. Much of the most promising work has used case study or
historical methods. Statistical methods have crashed up against funda-
mental data limitations. This is not a problem of measuring residuals.
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on the structure of organizations, on incentives within the organization, on
management, and so on—all the things that would be the beginnings of
empirical correlates of organizational capital—do not typically use the
same data used to study national economic growth. Indeed, most of the re-
search literature in organizations goes forward without using any of the
data resources of the federal statistical system at all, but is rather based in
the hard work of scholars in business schools.
The issue is not, I hasten to add, that the people working in the federal
statistical system are unaware of the changes in the organization of ﬁrms
and industries that matter for modern economic growth.3 Nor is the prob-
lem that the federal statistical system fails to understand the importance of
making data resources available to researchers for purposes of generating
new knowledge. Like me, they recognize the value of a thriving empirical
economic research program for future economic policymaking. The issue
is simply one of resources.
Results
While the paper has a number of subsidiary results, the main results are
as follows:
1. Measured organizational capital is large and makes a substantial
contribution to the growth of ﬁrm output.
The size of measured OC is diﬀerent in two methods used by the authors,
but it is in either case a substantial fraction of physical or R&D capital for
the ﬁrms they study.
2. Measured OC is persistent at the ﬁrm level.
The paper reports the persistence of its measures of OC and ﬁnds that it is
high. The paper also examines the underlying production function residu-
als themselves, ﬁnding them to be highly persistent. Thus, the persistence
of measured OC is not an artifact of the particular time series process as-
sumed by the authors.
3. Measured OC is correlated in the cross section with
a. Firm market share in its two-digit SIC industry
b. Firm expenditures on information technology
c. SGA (for the ﬁrst OC measure)
4. Value in the stock market at the moment the authors’ OC measure
could be calculated.
5. Stock market gains after their OC measure could be calculated.
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it classiﬁes establishments, of which an important part is recognizing some organizational
issues.These last two results come from a standard ﬁnancial markets valuation re-
gression. The ﬁnding that OC predicts ﬁrm value is in a regression in which
several other assets and analysts’ forecasts are held ﬁxed.
Interpretation of Results
The authors have made the tables, and any discussion naturally begins
with their interpretation. It should not end there, however, as many of the
substantive interpretations we ﬁnd in this paper involve further unveriﬁed
assumptions.
Findings 1 and 2, substantial measured organizational capital and sub-
stantially persistent measured OC, seem to me to be better labeled “as-
sumptions” than “results.” The paper reports that the contribution of or-
ganizational capital to the growth of sales is large. Since OC was measured
as a residual (or a residual projected onto SGA) from a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
production function, the contribution of OC to growth in output is an
identity, not a result.
Similarly, the ﬁnding that measured OC is persistent at the ﬁrm level is
the ﬁnding that a ﬁrm production function residual is persistent at the ﬁrm
level. That well-known fact establishes that ﬁrms are diﬀerent in ways that
move slowly, not necessarily that the reason for that is OC.
The three subﬁndings under result 3 are interpreted by the authors as ev-
idence that their economic interpretation is right. I am less convinced.
Findings 3a, 3b, and 3c establish that the production function residual is
correlated with market share, IT budgets, and SGA. I have already talked
about the SGA correlation. The interpretation the authors oﬀer for the
ﬁrst two correlations is that improvements in OC improve ﬁrm competitive
position and that OC and IT are complements. I agree with both of those
economic conclusions but do not see any evidence for them in this paper.
The ﬁnding about market share seems to me to be simply a restatement
of what the paper does. Positive production function residuals arise when
a ﬁrm’s sales rise more rapidly than its inputs. A ﬁrm will have a larger
value of those residuals when, relative to other ﬁrms, its sales/input is ris-
ing rapidly. That could happen because the ﬁrm has grown more produc-
tive through a positive improvement in its organization, the authors’ pre-
ferred interpretation, or because there has been an outward shock to the
ﬁrm’s demand for any reason, which would cause output and measured
productivity to rise. There is a substantial literature that attempts to sort
out these two diﬀerent ﬂows of causation in order to identify the part of the
ﬁrm-level productivity residual that is in fact a shock to the production
function. This paper interprets the entire correlation as productivity.
The ﬁnding about IT is one of a long series of ﬁndings that IT budgets
are correlated with success at the ﬁrm level. The work of Erik Brynjolfsson,
alone and with collaborators, has established this fairly clearly. In work
that I did with Erik and Lorin Hitt, cited above, the correlation is very care-
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ganization that lead to productivity improvements and how much reﬂects
other ﬂows of causation. There is no similar eﬀort in this paper.
In short, I agree that improvements in organization at the ﬁrm level, of-
ten in recent years connected to IT, are an important area for productivity
growth. What I don’t see in this paper is an attractive measure of that or any
evidence for it. The paper’s complaint that “there exist no operational mea-
sures of ﬁrms’ organizational capital” is still right.
Capital Markets
The paper goes on to show that high-measured-OC ﬁrms are (ﬁnding 4)
more valuable in the stock market and (ﬁnding 5) get predictable stock-
market gains. The authors conclude that investors reward ﬁrms that have
invested in OC before the returns on that capital are visible (4) but under-
value this capital (5).
The ﬁnding that high-measured-OC ﬁrms are more valuable in the con-
temporary stock market (4) follows from the measurements. Any eco-
nomic interpretation of measured OC would likely lead to ﬁnding 4—in-
cluding the authors’ interpretation, but also including any other.
Finding 5 is more interesting. Whenever stock market returns can be
predicted in a regression, there is something to pay attention to. The un-
dervaluation conclusion follows from the empirical ﬁnding that returns in
stock prices can be econometrically predicted using the measure of OC.4
I am dubious about the economic conclusion. My doubt has its roots in
two arguments, one about the sample period and the other about measured
OC.
The sample period begins in the 1990s (for this exercise) and ends in
2000. That is a period of surprising sustained macroeconomic expansion.
The capital markets appeared to base valuation of companies in this era at
least in part on the view that the aggregate economy would continue to
have surprising growth, and so that growth companies would continue to
have good prospects. This is not an idea that was quite so important in the
capital markets either earlier or, as we now know, later.
In general, this was a good period in which to have been holding equities
in ﬁrms that grew with or faster than the aggregate economy. A bull market,
in short. The authors’ measures of OC are measures of relative company
growth. When company sales per unit input rise, measured OC will rise.
So the evidence in this paper that there is a “misevaluation of organiza-
tional capital on the stock market” (or the need for a new risk factor) is this.
Holding a portfolio of growth companies during the 1990s would have led
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4. An alternative interpretation the authors oﬀer is that this ﬁnding might point us toward
“a new risk factor associated with organizational capital.” I will treat that as part of their main
interpretation.to extraordinary gains. It seems to me that there is a long step from that ev-
idence to the conclusion that the capital markets undervalue “organiza-
tional capital.”
Those remarks merely report what I hope is standard applied ﬁnance
common sense. You could “show” by these methods that many diﬀerent as-
sets were “undervalued” in the 1990s. U.S. equities in general, for example,
could be “shown” to be undervalued in that period by the methods used in
this paper. Anyone who held U.S. equities through that time period earned
good returns. The problem is, you are looking at a long bull market. You
always do well buying stocks before a bull market. You also will always do
particularly well buying high-measured-OC stocks before a bull market.
There are many, many plausible ways in which the U.S. stock market was
getting valuation wrong in the 1990s. A bubble in which all equities were
overvalued is one plausible way, and a bubble in which growth stocks were
overvalued is another plausible way. I think that these authors have some
more work to do before they make a convincing case that U.S. equities mar-
kets were seriously undervaluing growth companies in the 1990s.
Two Industries’ and Four Firms’ “OC”
The paper names about a dozen leading ﬁrms in several industries as
widely cited examples. It attributes the sustained success of these ﬁrms to
OC, conceptualized as a factor of production unique to these ﬁrms within
their industries. I know two of the industries from which these ﬁrms are
drawn, motor vehicles and computing, well enough to use them to consider
the broader issues raised by the ﬁrm-level OC approach.
In automobiles, there is cross-section variation in the eﬀectiveness of
ﬁrms in managing design, production, and distribution processes. One im-
portant innovation here is undoubtedly organizational, at least in part. I
refer to the Toyoda system (sometimes called Kanban or “lean produc-
tion”) of manufacturing automobiles. The authors link this organizational
to Toyota Motor Company’s current market position. That is largely right,
but to understand the broader economic issues related to that calls for add-
ing two pieces of context.
First, half a century ago when Eiji Toyoda, Ed Deming, and (especially)
Taiichi Ohno were working on this organizational improvement, Toyota
Motor Company was not the automobile market leader. Back then, Gen-
eral Motors (GM) was the acknowledged leader in “organizational capi-
tal” in that industry, based on the (also undoubtedly organizational, at
least in part) innovations of Alfred P. Sloan at GM.5 Dramatic improve-
ments in “organizational capital” may create huge gains to society, as they
did in this case—twice. General Motors created a new form of organiza-
tion to leapfrog market leader Ford; Toyota in turn created a new form of
organization to leapfrog GM.
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5. See, e.g., Womack, Jones, and Roos (1991).The point is the basic one of creative destruction. Society’s stock of OC
does not necessarily come from existing dominant ﬁrms, but instead from
the dynamic incentives of entrepreneurial outsiders. Society has an inter-
est in the organization of markets as well as of ﬁrms. Markets in which cre-
ative destruction can play out create new OC—by destroying the economic
value of old OC.
Second, measuring the stock of OC by comparing leading ﬁrms to oth-
ers is a dangerous business. Successful imitation by other automobile ﬁrms
lowers Toyota’s measured OC but not its actual OC. It increases the social
stock of OC. To the extent that prices fall from successful imitation and
competition, the imitating ﬁrms do not have any measured OC. Similarly,
GM’s measured OC fell as other ﬁrms (Ford, Chrysler, and the ancestors
of American Motors) imitated its organization, and fell further when new
competitive organizations like Toyota entered.
Again, the basic conceptual point comes from the economics of com-
petitive markets. There is no simple and direct relationship between ﬁrm
performance and industry performance. Society’s stock of OC cannot be
calculated by adding up the stocks of ﬁrm OC as measured in this paper.
The authors bring up two examples of ﬁrms from the computer industry
where they see “organizational capital” as the source of sustained leading
positions: IBM and Microsoft. This is partly right, and it raises a new is-
sue. Both of those ﬁrms originally built leading positions in that industry
through superior performance.6 IBM’s superior performance clearly had
organizational roots, as Tom Watson, Jr., built a ﬁrm that could both in-
vent and market large-scale computers. Microsoft’s early superior perfor-
mance was more related to the brilliance of the entrepreneurs who founded
it, Paul Allen and (especially) Bill Gates.
The long-term success of both of those ﬁrms has other causes, however.
Each had a long run as the dominant ﬁrm in its industry (Microsoft’s con-
tinues today). The idea that something you might call “organizational cap-
ital” sustained either ﬁrm in its long period of industry dominance is false.
It was not superior performance that kept IBM in a position of leadership
through the 1970s and 1980s, nor is it superior performance that keeps Mi-
crosoft in a position of leadership today.
Long after its organization had become a liability rather than an asset,
IBM held on to market dominance in the mainframe computer industry.
The advantages that sustained it were positional, not organizational. Years
later, when a long, slow process ﬁnally removed IBM from its prior posi-
tion, the importance of competition and ideas from outside was univer-
sally acknowledged, even from ex-IBMers. While slow, the process of cre-
ative destruction ultimately worked.
In the present, Microsoft’s dominant position in the personal computer
(PC) industry does not arise from superior organization. When Internet
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6. See Bresnahan and Malerba (1999) for more detail.entrepreneurs came along, they outinvented and outmarketed Micro-
soft—just as the young Microsoft outperformed IBM in the early days 
of the PC. Microsoft continued its dominance by blocking distribution of
competitively threatening technologies.7 Where the fall of IBM is an ex-
ample of successful creative destruction, Microsoft’s ability to evade com-
petition is an example of blocked creative destruction.
The broad point is that “what’s good for GM is good for the country” is
nonsense. What’s good for the continued growth of the United States and
of the world economy is the competitive system that permits creative de-
struction. Current public policy in the United States has permitted Mi-
crosoft to evade even the threat of creative destruction from new competi-
tors born on the Internet. Current public policy is leaning strongly toward
putting the “baby bells” back in the position AT&T once enjoyed. When
public policy faces decisions like that, it is important to remember the dis-
tinction between the economy’s stock of OC, which includes dynamic com-
petition, and leading ﬁrms’ stock of measured OC, which is larger when
there is less dynamic competition.
The paper by Lev and Radhakrishnan focuses on productivity growth in
large, existing ﬁrms, especially ones that are relatively successful in their in-
dustry. The paper makes an argument in favor of focusing exclusively on
that topic in the study of productivity growth in the whole economy. The
exclusivity is a mistake; the error made by this paper in arguing for exclu-
sivity is a form of an increasingly common error.
Productivity, Economic Growth, and Organization
Is individual ﬁrm OC the growth pole of the U.S. economy? Is sustained
ﬁrm-level success caused by superior organization pervasive in the econ-
omy, observed in almost every industry? Is ﬁrm-level OC “the major source
of competitive advantage” that we should be careful to value? Is the cen-
tral locus of this OC in large, established, successful ﬁrms? With or with-
out the “organization capital” label, the view that all these questions
should be answered “yes” is growing more common in discussion of eco-
nomic policy formation. That view makes an error at two levels.
The view omits most of the forces that matter to productivity growth at
the economywide level. It leaves out fundamental advances in science and
engineering, for example, and their later conversion into commercially val-
uable products and processes. It leaves out ﬁrm growth, birth, and death,
and the importance of market selection in productivity growth. Perhaps
most important, it leaves out entrepreneurship and the possibility of cre-
ative destruction.
At a second level, that view makes an important conceptual error.
Around 1970, the world looked to ﬁrms like IBM, GM, and AT&T as ex-
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7. While these claims are controversial, they should not be. They are what the Microsoft
documents showed and what the courts, both in trial and on appeal, have found.emplars of excellence in organization. Public policy listened to the idea
that they were an excellent form of organization, as did business policy.
Later, in the 1980s, many studies of productivity growth looked to interna-
tional comparisons. The higher rate of productivity growth in Japan than
in the United States led to the advice that business and public policy should
emulate Japanese keiretsu. My point is that closely linking analysis at the
ﬁrm level to analysis at the national or world economic growth level is a
common mistake.
Indeed, the single most common usage of the phrase “new economy”
that forms part of the title of this conference was “new economy company.”
That meant something very particular in the ﬁrm valuation theory that
drove the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. It meant that ﬁrm-level or-
ganizational capital of a new form was the engine of economic growth. A
particular form of startup was supposed to be the key exemplar of superior
performance.
And now we are returning to the view that large-scale successful enter-
prises have valuable lessons for public policy and business policy—the
view of this paper and much other recent analysis. Like the earlier version
of that view (1970) or the view that keiretsu were the way to go (1980s) or
that overcaﬀeinated startups had all the organizational capital (1990s), this
new view is shortsighted.
The error in all four analyses is the same. The error is notthe speciﬁc one
that we paid “too much attention” to large established ﬁrms in the 1960s or
today or that we paid “too much attention” to startups in the late 1990s or
“too much attention” to Japan in the 1980s. The mistake lies in thinking
that it is a sensible approach to productivity growth analysis to have a sys-
tem where we “pay attention” in this sense to anything at all. The view in
which scholarship has the job of ﬁguring out what kind of ﬁrm organiza-
tion is a good kind, and business and public policy have the job of “paying
attention” to the scholarship and thus to the form of ﬁrm, is dangerous
nonsense. It reduces economics to a kind of second-rate industrial engi-
neering, and injects an element of central planning into policy formation.
Ignoring markets is a serious oversight, both conceptually and for mea-
surement. While organization at the ﬁrm level is economically important,
focusing too closely on success at the level of the ﬁrm ignores much of what
is important for growth in a marketeconomy. Measures of ﬁrm success that
are based in comparison to other ﬁrms must take market competition into
account.
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